Trigger Warnings: 

Child Abuse mention

Acknowledgments and Limitations

As the title of this paper suggests, before we can answer these questions, we must establish a framework to understand this matter.

First, if one of the two males in a same-sex relation mentioned in this are known to be under aged – i.e. described as “youth” or “boy” – though it must be noted that sometimes the Greeks themselves used these terms inconsistently, it is important to acknowledge this as paedophilia and child abuse first, same-sex relation second. Had the pederasty involved young girls and not boys, books on the topic would not have been called “Heterosexuality” or “Opposite-Sex Relations in Classical Athens”. At last, it should be noted how common age gaps also were in male/female couplings in Athens. It is textbook homophobic for MacDowell and others to read about Athenian men sexually abusing young boys, and immediately conflate it with “homosexuality” and/or “same-sex relations” as the main descriptor, thus failing to consider the historical evidence of age gaps in all relationships in Athens.

Second, as we will see in the material below, the history of same-sex relations in Classical Athens is also a history of sex-work. To stray from confusion, if a source uses words like “catamite” or “prostitute”, I will only use the word “sex-work” to stay consistent.

Thus are the limitations of court speeches as our analytical lens. The focus will be on the exploitation of young boys by Athenian men, and on the legal disenfranchisement of male sex-workers.

About male sex-workers

In MacDowell’s Athenian Laws About Homosexuality (2000) the primary source is Aiskhines’ oration Against Timarkos. The main issue raised by Aiskhines is not necessarily that Timarkhos has had same-sex relations, but rather that he, allegedly, used to be a male sex-worker. It is not his status as a possible male loving male that is scrutinized, but rather that, if it is true that he has employed himself in sex-work, he is breaking the legal limitations surrounding male sex-workers who were Athenian citizens.

Sex-work was legal. However, if a male Athenian citizen arose to the vocation, a number of legal ramifications arose with it.1 The male sex-working Athenian was marked, he was atimos – deemed “morally unfit”2 to perform and participate in certain public actions. It is not only a moral issue, but very much so a legal one. He was not allowed to speak in the Ekklesia, taking a public office, being a member of the dikastai, speaking on behalf of himself or a friend in court, and could enter neither public temples nor the Agora.

In his oration, Aeschines attempted to argue that Timarchos had been paid to do sex-work, unlike Aeschines who was the epitome of the “Morally Good Gay”. He brings up, that “I have myself been engaged in erotic passion, and am still today [...] but it is shameful to be persuaded by the hire-fee and prostitute oneself”3

He makes a distinction between “loving those who are beautiful”, which is equated with moral superiority – a “generous and sympathetic” way to perform a same-sex relation – and sex-work, which to Aeschines is to be equated with the act of a hybristes and an “uneducated” man. If the judges rules that Timarchos has indeed performed sex-work, it would be disastrous for Timarchos’ career, as Aeschines mentions the legal limitations regarding male sex-work: “If anyone acts contrary to these provisions, he has provided indictments for being a sex-worker, and imposed the heaviest penalties for the offense”4

The legal ramifications of male sex-work implied a two-category system of same sex relations that are morally degrading for an Athenian citizens and types of same-sex relations that are acceptable. One of such legally acceptable “same-sex relations” we may find in the context of the case between Lysias’ client and Simon, wherein two adult men fight for the – very likely coerced – “favor” of a “young” boy that they both are “in love with”. It should be noted that due to the Greek language used, pais, we are not certain whether Theodotos is a young Athenian or an enslaved (possibly adult) man. Regardless of the answer to that question, Theodotos is undoubtedly an infantalized individual, which is where the elements of child abuse and slavery intertwine with the history of same-sex relations in Athens.

Objectification and Child Abuse

  In itself, the case of Lysias’ client and Simon takes no issue with the age gap between Lysias’ client, Simon and Theodotos, the Platanian pais caught between the two men in question. The case is regarding the alleged violence that has taken place between Lysias’ client and Simon, allegedly mostly from Simon, over the “ownership” of this pais.

As we have seen in the case against Diogeiton5, women in Athens were legally on the same level of rights as a minor, and to some degree, an object6. Had Diogeitons daughter been able to actually control and own the inheritance from her father, the alleged fraudster’s escapades could have been completely unnecessary. Instead, he can “give” her to his brother, as she is his possession.

This is one of many examples of the Athenian women being portrayed as objects. One aspect of this is the wording of “giving a woman away in marriage” used in a number of forensic speeches7 Another aspect is in Dem. 59.112, where female sex-work is framed as a “trade of whores”, in contrast to how, as we have shown earlier, a male-sex worker was described as “selling himself”. Though it should be noted that the descriptions of Timarchus has commonalities with the case of Neara8, using language to undermine a woman’s agency is a central strategy to the process of objectification.

According to [Dem.] 59.122, women’s functions boiled down to three roles:

“For we have courtesans [hetairai] for pleasure, and concubines for the daily service of our bodies, but wives for the production of legitimate offspring and to have reliable guardian of our household property”9

To Apollodorus, women represent sexual pleasure, intimacy, and child bearing. Any actions related to these three become culturally connected to femininity, a limited sexual framework that the Athenian men would have to understand their attractions to men within. Athenian same-sex relations were experienced through a hetero-normative framework, which impacted the nature of the same-sex relations presented in the court speeches. Lysias’ client and Simon understand their attraction to Theodotos through the same framework, with slightly different perspectives. Where they agree, is that a man like them can “claim possession” over Theodotos, in the same way that men, with permission from the woman’s kyrios, could “claim possession” over a young woman. Both Lysias’ client and Simon have to see Theodotos as an object without agency, for their own attraction to cognitively make sense. Where they disagree is on the topic of how to treat the “possession”, at least according to Lysias’ client.

“I tried to win his affection by treating him well, while Simon thought that with violent and lawless behaviour he would force the boy to do whatever he wanted.“10

In the portrayal of Simon, which can be assume as biased to be as negative as possible, it is clear that he sees Theodotos as a physical belonging, a toy for his own desires, that he has the “right” to claim, and do with as he pleases. He even claims to have offered the boy payment of 300 drachmas,11 which pairs well with Simon’s view of Theodotos as an object in the very physical sense.

This is one outcome of the treatment women within Athenian society as objects to “claim” – which is that when a man like Simon finds himself attracted to men, if he is not aware of the framework he has been taught, he can easily fall into the trap of thinking that anyone he is attracted to must be inferior to him.

Lysias’ client claims to be better than this, but it is still clear that he is also understanding his attraction to Theodotos through the hetero-normative lens, albeit a different aspect of it. He still sees Theodotos as an object to be desired, but not an object to necessarily “claim”, rather an object to “deserve” and protect from violence. He may not, allegedly, be violent towards the boy, but there is still an emphasis on understanding the relationship through the lens of an “active”, “lover” older partner with more power than the “passive” object of desire.

This brings us back to the question of the disenfranchisement of male sex-workers. With this sexual dynamic in mind, it is much clearer why a man who was an Athenian citizen, was stripped of his rights if he were to sell his body. In the process of receiving payment for sexual favors, it is assumed that he loses his position as an objectifying power, and enters the realm of the objectified. The disenfranchisement is a vital tool for the same-sex relationships between the men of Athens to be ‘compatible’ with their misogynist cognition, lest too much cognitive dissonance might destabilize the patriarchal oikos. The laws were simply put, used to uphold the status quo, the roles that were defined within the oikos. Homosexuality was allowed to “exist” in Athens, as long as it stayed within the framework of the oikos. Furthermore, the idea of “selling one’s body” could also be considered the feature of an enslaved, which was another moral pollution that the laws against same-sex relations kept “at bay”.

Limitation 2: Women

The cases brought fourth so far have only regarded relations between males. Why are there no such cases involving women who engaged with other women? The first caveat that comes to mind is that if we consider the hypothetical case that an Athenian woman were to pay another Athenian women for sex-work, the list of rights that were stripped from the male sex-worker were rights that Athenian women did not have the same access to whatsoever. Women were not seen as capable of having agency, and thus could not vote in court of be a part of a panel of judges. There is simply nothing at stake, as it was implied that only men could sexually corrupt another man’s woman.12 The concept of queer women’s sexuality is far beyond the scope of the framework that Athenian sexuality was understood in, at least when it pertains to the legal field – court speeches and legal discourse.

Thus the second aspect that comes to mind is the hypothetical case of a woman sexually abusing a young person, as would be a case that could have appeared, had the law on men abusing boys been inclusive of that. Such a case cannot exist in a sexual framework that pictures the woman as always being the passive receiver. To conceptualize a hypothetical sexual abuse like this would require the court to acknowledge the woman as a possible active participant, with agency. Furthermore, one can imagine that if a woman had a sexual relation to a married woman, the law would not even consider that an option – perhaps as such a relation, if both partners were cisgender women, could not result in children. The Athenian laws on infidelity only targets hetero-normative couplings.13

Conclusion

This further supports the theory that same-sex relations in Athens were understood through the lens of the oikos, and therefore the laws must reflect that. To avoid the existence of same-sex relations endangering the patriarchal structure of the oikos, same-sex relations had to be moderated, through the disenfranchisement of male sex-workers, and the normalization of the pederasty. Having a homosexual relation was legal, as long as you did it in a oikos-honouring heterosexual way.

Footnotes

1. MacDowell, "Athenian laws about homosexuality”, p.23.

2. MacDowell, “Athenian laws about homosexuality”, p.24.

3. Aeschin. 1.132–137.

4. Aeschin. 1.19-20.

5. Lys. 32.

6. An ”object” here is meant as an object in the subject/object sense of the word.

7. See for example: Dem. 44.10, Isae. 2.6, [Dem.] 59.122.

8. [Dem.] 59.16-48.

9. Dem. 43.11–15.

10. Lysias 3.5.

11. Lysias 3.22.

12. See for example: Lys.1

13. For example: Lys.1.

Bibliography

• Aeschines. “Aeschines: Against Timarchos”. I Against Timarchos, trans. N. R. E. Fisher

• Clarendon Ancient History Series. New York: Oxford Univ. Pr, 2007.

• Carey, C. Trials from Classical Athens, 1997.

• Gagarin, M., red. “Lysias 32, Against Diogeiton §§ 1–6”. I Speeches from Athenian Law. University of Texas Press, 2011. https://doi.org/10.7560/723627.

• S. C. Todd, “CASE I: LYSIAS 1 – ON THE KILLING OF ERATOSTHENES”. I A Commentary on Lysias, Speeches 1-11 Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

• Lysias. “Case V: Lysias 3 - Reply to Simon, A Defence”. I A Commentary on Lysias, Speeches 1-11, trans. S. C. Todd. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

• MacDowell, D.M. “Athenian laws about homosexuality”. Revue internationale des droits de l’andtqiuité 42 (2000): 13–27.

• MacDowell, Douglas M. The Law in Classical Athens. 4. print. Aspects of Greek and Roman Life. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1995.